About me
I am a philosopher, best known for my work on “race”. I argue that there are no races, only racialised groups.
I also work more generally in philosophy of science, focusing on biology and psychology.
I’m based at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, where I have an ongoing position.
In my spare time I like to make pottery and paint weird abstract scenes.
This is my greyhound Pegasus. Go on, click on her link. She’s cute.
Publications
- Hochman, A. (2022) Has social constructionism about race outlived its usefulness?: Perspectives from a race skeptic. Biology & Philosophy 37(48): 1–20
- Hochman, A. (2022) Racial Classification Without Race: Edwards’ Fallacy. In: Remapping Race in a Global Context. Edited by Ludovica Lorusso and Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther. 74–91
- Hochman, A. (2021) Review of ‘What Is Race? Four Philosophical Views.’ Philosophical Review 130(4): 596–600
- Hochman, A. (2021) Further Defense of the Racialization Concept: A Reply to Uyan. Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 18(1), 31–48
- Hochman, A. (2021) Janus-Faced Race: Is Race Biological, Social, or Mythical? American Journal of Physical Anthropology 175(2), 453–464
- Hochman, A. (2021) Against the Reification of Race in Bioethics: Anti-Racism without Racial Realism. The American Journal of Bioethics 21(2), 88–90
- Hochman, A. (2019) Is “Race” Modern? Disambiguating the Question. Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 16(2), 647–665
- Hochman, A. (2019) Race and Reference. Biology & Philosophy 34:32
- Hochman, A. (2019) Racialization: A Defense of the Concept. Ethnic & Racial Studies. 42(8)1245-1262
- Hochman, A. (2017) In Defense of the Metaphysics of Race. Philosophical Studies. 174(11):2709-2729
- Hochman, A. (2017) Replacing Race: Interactive Constructionism about Racialized Groups. Ergo. 4(3):61-92
- Hochman, A. (2016) Race: Deflate or Pop? Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 57:60–68
- Hochman, A. & Lipphardt, V. (2016) Rasse oder Vielfalt: Was sagt die Wissensforschung? Kontroverse Annäherungen an die Kategorie race. In: Christina Isabel Brüning/Lars Deile/Martin Lücke/Julia Nahrstedt (Hg): Historisches Lernen als Rassismuskritik, Wochenschau-Verlag: Schwalbach
- Hochman, A. (2015) Of Vikings and Nazis: Norwegian contributions to the rise and the fall of the idea of a superior Aryan race. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 54:84-88
- Griffiths, P. & Hochman, A. (2015) Developmental Systems Theory. Encyclopedia of Life Sciences
- Hochman, A. (2014) Unnaturalised Racial Naturalism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 46:79-87
- Hochman, A. (2014) Race Suicide. Living Archives on Eugenics.
- Hochman, A. (2013) Against the New Racial Naturalism. The Journal of Philosophy. 110(6):331-351
- Hochman, A. (2013) Do We Need a Device to Acquire Ethnic Concepts? Philosophy of Science. 80(5):994-1005
- Hochman, A. (2013) Racial discrimination: How not to do it. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 44(3):278-286
- Hochman, A. (2013) The Phylogeny Fallacy and the Ontogeny Fallacy. Biology & Philosophy 28(4):593-612
Media
This is a piece I wrote for The Conversation. It would be a good place to start for those wanting to get a general sense of my work.
This recasts my article in The Du Bois Review for a broader audience. It offers a new solution to the debate about the origins of “race”.
In this piece I connect my work on the metaphysics of race with questions of personal identity
This is a radio interview I did for ABC Radio National’s The Philosopher’s Zone. The interviewer is Joe Gelonesi and the other guest is Prof. Justin E H Smith.
Major Research Projects, Grants and Awards
2019 – 2021
Social Constructionism About Race, Deconstructed
I am currently on a Discovery Early Career Researcher Award (DECRA), funded by the Australian Research Council (ARC). Valued at over half a million dollars, it allows me to focus primarily on my research for three years.
Project Summary
This project aims to show that there are no races, only racialised groups. Race was once thought to be biologically real, a position which is increasingly rejected by specialists. Now race is commonly believed to be a social construct, which is often taken to mean that races are real social groups. This project aims to demonstrate that when race is defined socially it loses its conceptual and historical specificity, and that racial classification should be abandoned altogether. An expected outcome of the project is a scholarly and public shift away from racial classification. This project develops and defends the category of the racialised group as an alternative to one of history’s most misleading and dangerous ideas.
2015 – 2018
What is This Thing Called Race?
In 2014 my PhD was conferred. In 2015 I was awarded a Macquarie University Research Fellowship, which is a highly competitive three-year research grant.
Project Summary
The debate about the biological reality of race is raging once again. There is an emerging consensus regarding the facts about human biological diversity. However, this is not moving the debate toward a resolution because scholars are employing different definitions of ‘race’. Defend a strong definition of race – such as the view that races are human subspecies – and racial naturalism is clearly false (there are no human subspecies). However, defend a weak definition of race – such as the view that races are genetically identifiable geographical populations – and racial naturalism appears to be true. In this project I drew on philosophy of language, genetic anthropology, and the history of the race concept to argue against weak definitions of race. We should give race a substantive biological definition, and conclude that race fails as a biological category.
2010 – 2014
Beyond Biological Naturalism and Social Constructionism about Race: An Interactive Constructionist Approach to Racialisation
In 2010 I was offered an Australian Postgraduate Award to support my PhD thesis. It contained the seeds of ideas that I am still growing, and publishing.
Project Summary
What is this thing called ‘race’? There are at least three possible answers to this deceptively simple little question. Race might be biologically real, socially real, or not real at all. These three metaphysical positions are known as racial naturalism, social constructionism about race, and anti-realism about race, respectively. In this thesis I argue for anti-realism about race. While anti-realism is the right metaphysical position about race, or so I will argue, it leaves an explanatory gap. Race naturalists and social constructionists are talking about something, and the anti-realist about race needs to account for that something, whatever it is. To fill the explanatory gap I introduce a new kind of constructionism. Borrowing from developmental systems theory (DST) I call it ‘interactive constructionism’. Unlike social constructionism, interactive constructionism is not about race. Rather, it is about racialised groups. We should be careful not to conflate the two. Racialised groups are real, races are not. Interactive constructionism offers a framework for understanding how and why groups, which are not properly described as races, become racialised.
2009 – 2010
The Phylogeny Fallacy and the Ontogeny Fallacy
In 2009 I was awarded an Honours Scholarship by University of Sydney.
Project Summary
In this project I offer a new and improved understanding of the phylogeny fallacy and I identify a new fallacy of explanation in the biological sciences: the ontogeny fallacy. I argue that the phylogeny fallacy is best understood to occur when a proposed proximate explanation is no more than an evolutionary explanation in disguise (e.g., in unsubstantiated claims that a trait is directed by a “genetic program” produced by natural selection). Having thus defined the phylogeny fallacy, I identify its counterpart—its mirror image—in the ontogeny fallacy. The ontogeny fallacy is committed when a proposed evolutionary explanation is a proximate explanation in disguise (e.g., in claims that population-level evolutionary analysis is unnecessary, because phylogeny or evolutionary history is a successive sequence of ontogenies or developmental histories). Evolutionary theorists are prone to commit the phylogeny fallacy, while developmentalists are prone to commit the ontogeny fallacy. These fallacies are conflations of how and why questions. This project contributes to our understanding of how explanation works, and fails to work, in the biological sciences.